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Abstract—The prevalence of mobile devices and Location-
Based Services (LBS) necessitate the study of Location Privacy-
Preserving Mechanisms (LPPM). However, LPPMs reduce the
utility of LBS due to the noise they add to users’ locations.
Here, we consider the remapping technique, which presumes the
adversary has a perfect statistical model for the user location. We
consider this assumption and show that under practical assump-
tions on the adversary’s knowledge, the remapping technique
leaks privacy not only about the true location data, but also about
the statistical model. Finally, we introduce a novel solution called
“Randomized Remapping” as a countermeasure.
Index Terms—Location-Based Services (LBS), Information
leakage, Obfuscation, Remapping technique, Location Privacy
Preserving Mechanisms (PPMs).
I. INTRODUCTION
Mobile devices, ranging from smart phones to connected
automobiles, provide ubiquitous communication and offer a
wide spectrum of location-based services (LBS), such as ride
sharing, navigation, dining recommendations, and accident
warnings. LBS collect large amounts of users’ location data
to tailor the service provided to each user’s specific needs.
To address the significant threat to user privacy due to lo-
cation data sharing [1], multiple location privacy-preserving
mechanisms (LPPMs) are proposed in the literature. Location
data obfuscation is the main theme of all LPPMs, which
enhances privacy by using misleading, false, or ambiguous
information [2]–[8]. However, obfuscation degrades system
utility to enhance privacy [6], [9].
Recently, a remapping technique was proposed to improve
the utility of LPPMs without compromising privacy [10].
Remapping addresses privacy against an adversary with perfect
knowledge of the prior distribution of a user’s location data. In-
stead of releasing the obfuscated location, remapping releases
an estimated location that the adversary would infer anyway.
Therefore, remapping improves utility as the estimated loca-
tion is closer to the true location than the obfuscated location.
We model remapping as a general utility improvement
technique for releasing not just location data but any type
of data, e.g., IoT application data. Therefore, we consider
Gaussian distributed private data whose privacy is protected
This work was supported by National Science Foundation under grants
CCF–1421957 and CNS–1739462.
by adding carefully calibrated Gaussian noise to it. Gaussian
distributed data has been long considered in various domains,
e.g., sensor networks [11]–[13] and distributed consensus [14],
as a promising substitute to the real data. Therefore, our
analysis of the remapping technique for Gaussian distributed
data generalizes to all such domains. In addition, modeling the
probability of a userâA˘Z´s check-in at a location based on a
Multi-center Gaussian Model is being employed widely [15]–
[19]. A significant characteristic of check-in locations is that
they are usually located around several centers, and the prob-
ability of a user visiting a location is inversely proportional
to the distance from its nearest center; thus, users’ check-in
behavior can be modeled with a Gaussian distribution. Our
Gaussian model could thus be used within a given region of
the multi-center Gaussian model.
Here, we consider a friend (e.g., an IoT application on a
smart phone) without any prior statistical information about
user behavior and an adversary with statistical information
about the user’s behavior. This may occur, for example, when
each intended recipient is either naive or only looking at a
single datum or a small set of data from the user, whereas the
adversary is sophisticated and has access to the user’s data
across a large time period.
In such a case, the adversary can use their statistical
advantage to obtain a better estimate of the user’s data than
the friend. Remapping recognizes this fact and reveals a more
accurate version of the data that the adversary would have been
able to obtain anyway using her statistical advantage. Thus,
remapping technique does not incur privacy loss, but improves
accuracy for the user. Hence, by recognizing this asymmetry
in prior knowledge, utility has been improved without privacy
loss versus standard obfuscation; a simple example of the
mechanism is demonstrated in Section II. Not surprisingly,
this approach has garnered a growing amount of interest in
the privacy community [20]–[24], hence motivating a more
fundamental analysis.
Note that the classical remapping technique implicitly as-
sumes that the sophisticated adversary has knowledge of the
exact statistical model of the user data. However, in practice
this is not the case, as the adversary’s knowledge is a noisy
version of the exact statistical model of the user data due to
multiple reasons, e.g., the user not reporting some of her data,
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a limited history, or the reported data being noisy due to a
glitch or noise in its transmission. We explore the remapping
technique from the lens of this practical setting where the
adversary has an imperfect knowledge of the statistical model
of the user’s data. We detail our contributions next.
Contributions: In this paper, we take the first information-
theoretic look at this remapping technique. We introduce a
simple information-theoretic model to explain how the utility
can be improved without a loss in privacy. Next, we employ
our model to explore important aspects of remapping that
have not been considered before. As acknowledged briefly
in [10], a risk of remapping is that it relies critically on
accurate knowledge of the adversary’s statistical model. In
particular, if the adversary does not have accurate statistical
information and the user employs remapping, we show that
privacy leaks in two separate ways: (i) the adversary obtains
a more accurate version of the data than they would have had
without remapping, and (ii) the adversary is able to improve
their statistical knowledge of the users’ data beyond what they
would have been able to do without remapping. Interestingly,
we will see that the second type of leakage is increased if the
obfuscation noise is increased. We provide the first analysis of
the loss of privacy due to each of these factors. After analyzing
the loss in privacy under standard remapping [10], we next
turn to countermeasures. We introduce a random remapping
algorithm, where data points are independently remapped with
some probability. For a given utility for the intended recipient,
this approach greatly complicates model improvement at the
adversary versus deterministic remapping approaches, thus
improving the privacy-utility trade-off.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section
II, we present the framework: system model, metrics, and
definitions. We next demonstrate in Section III how the current
remapping technique proposed by [10] increases utility while
satisfying the same level of privacy if the adversary has the
perfect prior (i.e. a perfect statistical model of the user’s
data). In Section IV, we quantify information leakage caused
by the mentioned remapping technique [10] if the adversary
does not have a perfect prior. In particular, we show that
leakage about the distribution of the true data is a serious issue.
Motivated by this, in Section V we propose a new method
called "Randomized Remapping" to improve the privacy for a
given utility in this situation. This method provides a trade-off
between leakage of the distribution of the true data and the
utility. In Section VI, we draw conclusions from the work and
present ideas for the future.
Due to space limitations, detailed derivations, additional
discussion, and more references are provided in the long
version of the paper [25].
II. SYSTEM MODEL AND METRICS
Consider a system where a user generates a location X
which should be protected from a potential adversary. To
preserve the privacy of the user’s true location, the obfuscated
location is obtained by adding noise W to X . In other words,
the reported noisy version of location (Y ) is obtained as
Fig. 1: System Model: Case where additive obfuscation (with-
out remapping) is applied to the user’s location. The (naive)
intended friend does not have a prior distribution for X and
hence employs Y for the user’s locations. A sophisticated
adversary, who possesses a prior distribution for X , can use
this prior to obtain a better estimate of the user’s location.
Y = X +W . As shown in Figure 1, there exists an “intended”
friend (e.g., an LBS) who does not have prior statistical
knowledge about the user behavior, and a “sophisticated”
adversary who has knowledge about the prior behavior of
the user (piAdv). The adversary observes the noisy reported
location Y and uses it to find the estimate X˜Adv , which
denotes the estimate of the adversary given their observed
location (Y ) and their knowledge of the prior about the user
(piAdv) as X˜Adv = E [X |Y, piAdv]. As a result, there exist
asymmetries in knowledge and/or sophistication between the
intended friend and the adversary. The remapping technique,
which is introduced by Chatzikokolakis et al. [10], exploits
these asymmetries to publish a more accurate version of the
location that the sophisticated adversary would have been able
to obtain anyway. As shown in Figure 2, each reported location
is remapped into the best possible location according to the
perfect prior information of the adversary.
Location Data Model: We adopt a Gaussian model. User
traces are assumed to be independent and identically dis-
tributed (i.i.d.) Gaussian series, and each data location is
drawn from a normal distribution with mean µ and variance
σ2s , X(k) ∼ N
(
µ, σ2s
)
. We also assume there exists some
underlying prior for the distribution of the mean (µ); we also
take this to be Gaussian, and hence assume µ ∼ N
(
0, σ2µ
)
.
Obfuscation Mechanism: The obfuscated location is obtained
by passing the data location through an additive white Gaus-
sian noise (AWGN) channel [26]–[28]. Hence, Y , the reported
location of the user, is the sum of the true location, X , and
the noise, W , where W is drawn from a zero-mean normal
distribution with variance equal to σ2w . Thus, we have
Y = X +W ∼ N
(
µ, σ2s + σ
2
w
)
.
Sophisticated Adversary Model: The adversary logs the
user’s locations over time to generate a prior about the behav-
ior of the user and performs an inference attack to estimate the
best possible location given this generated prior. Note that the
remapping literature [10] has considered a perfect prior for
the adversary. In reality, the adversary, however strong, does
not have an infinite time history of user’s data or have exact
knowledge of the user’s whereabouts, so she cannot build the
perfect prior. In this paper, different adversarial settings have
Fig. 2: Remapping: X is the user’s true location, W is the
amount of noise added through the obfuscation process, Y is
the noisy reported location after applying obfuscation, and YR
is the remapped location which is the best possible estimate
of the adversary according to perfect prior knowledge about
the user.
been considered: in Section III, we assume an adversary with
a perfect prior, and in Section IV, we assume an adversary
with an imperfect prior. It is critical to note that the adversary
knows the mechanism of the obfuscation, but she does not
know the exact value of the noise which will be added during
obfuscation and does not have any auxiliary information or
side information about the user’s location.
Remapping Mechanism: In the absence of remapping, and
given the perfect prior for the adversary, the adversary can
estimate X using the reported noisy version of the location
(Y ) as:
YR = E [X |Y, µ] = σ
2
w
σ2s + σ
2
w
µ +
σ2s
σ2s + σ
2
w
Y, (1)
where YR is the estimate of the adversary given the observed
location (Y ) and perfect knowledge of the prior (piAdv).
Remapping simply notes that, since the adversary obtains YR
anyway (as shown in Figure 2), we might as well provide it
to the applications to improve the utility [10].
Metrics: In this paper, the mean squared error (MSE) is
employed as a metric to quantify both utility degradation and
privacy. In this paper, “U” denotes the MSE of the intended
application/friend which quantifies utility degradation. In ad-
dition, “P” denotes the MSE of the adversary about the true
location, and “P`” denotes the MSE of the adversary about
the statistical model. Note that both “P” and “P`” quantify
the level of privacy.
III. CASE 1: ADVERSARY WITH PERFECT KNOWLEDGE
In this section, we assume the adversary knows the exact
statistical distribution of the user data, which for our model
means the exact value of the mean (µ).
A. Without Remapping
Without remapping, the user’s intended friend, who does not
have any knowledge of the statistical model for the user’s data,
observes only the noisy location (Y ). The utility degradation
is:
U(I )NR = E
[(
X˜App − X
)2]
= E
[(Y − X)2] = σ2w . (2)
In comparison to the user’s friend, the sophisticated adversary
obtains X˜Adv = E [X |Y, µ]. Thus, P(I )NR which quantifies the
level of privacy is calculated as:
P(I )NR = E
[(
X˜Adv − X
)2]
= E
[(YR − X)2] = σ2wσ2s
σ2s + σ
2
w
. (3)
B. With Remapping
In this case, both the adversary and the user’s friend observe
the same reported location, X˜Adv = X˜App = YR = E [X |Y, µ].
Now, the MSE of the adversary and the MSE of the application
are equal:
U(I )R = P(I )R = E
[(YR − X)2] = σ2wσ2s
σ2s + σ
2
w
. (4)
Since the intended friend/application is oblivious to the
prior statistical knowledge about the user behavior, the MSE
of the adversary is always smaller than or equal to the
MSE of the application (P ≤ U). Thus, we can conclude
that the remapping technique provides the best utility among
techniques satisfying the same level of privacy under the
assumption that the adversary has perfect knowledge of the
statistical model for the user data [29].
IV. CASE 2: ADVERSARY WITH IMPERFECT KNOWLEDGE
Here, we assume the adversary has a noisy version of the
prior information, as might be obtained from a learning set of
limited length. Specifically, the adversary has µˇ = µ+E , where
E has a zero-mean normal distribution with variance equal to
σ2e , as would be the case if µˇ were the minimum mean square
estimate (MMSE) based on prior observations with additive
Gaussian obfuscation. We consider not only the leakage of
the true location (X) but also the leakage of the distribution of
the true location (µ), which is a serious issue, as such leakage
would improve future estimates of the adversary.
A. Without Remapping
If remapping is not employed, the user’s intended friend ob-
serves the reported location (Y ). Thus, the utility is quantified
as:
U(I I )NR = E
[(
X˜App − X
)2]
= E
[(Y − X)2] = σ2w . (5)
In contrast, the sophisticated adversary uses both Y = µ +
S +W and µˇ = µ + E to improve knowledge not only about
the true location (X) but also about the distribution of the
true location (µ). Now, P`(I I )NR which quantifies the MSE of the
adversary about the distribution of the true location (µ) is:
P`(I I )NR = E
[
(µ˜Adv − µ)2
]
=
σ2eσ
2
µ
(
σ2s + σ
2
w
)(
σ2µ + σ
2
e
) (
σ2s + σ
2
w
)
+ σ2eσ
2
µ
.
(6)
and P(I I )NR which quantifies the MSE of the adversary about
the true location (X) is:
P(I I )NR = E
[(
X˜Adv − X
)2]
=
σ2sσ
2
w
σ2s + σ
2
w
+
σ4wσ
2
eσ
2
µ(
σ2s + σ
2
w
) ( (
σ2µ + σ
2
e
) (
σ2s + σ
2
w
)
+ σ2eσ
2
µ
) .
(7)
B. With Remapping
The user’s friend observes the remapped location, so the
utility of the system is:
U(I I )R = E
[(
X˜App − X
)2]
= E
[(YR − X)2] = σ2sσ2w
σ2s + σ
2
w
.
(8)
However, the adversary observes not only YR, but also µˇ, and
uses both of these observations to estimate µ˜Adv and X˜Adv .
Now, the MSE of the adversary about the distribution of the
true location (µ) is:
P`(I I )R = E
[
(µ˜Adv − µ)2
]
=
σ4sσ
2
eσ
2
µ
σ4s
(
σ2µ + σ
2
e
)
+ σ2eσ
2
µ
(
σ2s + σ
2
w
) ,
(9)
and the MSE of the adversary about the true location (X) is:
P(I I )R =E
[(
X˜Adv − X
)2]
=
σ2sσ
2
w
σ2s + σ
2
w
.
Numerical results demonstrating what can be learned from
these expression will be presented in Section V.
C. Discussion: Leakage of the Statistical Model
From (9), we can conclude that increasing the obfuscation
noise, somewhat surprisingly, increases the leakage about the
distribution of the true location (µ) when remapping is em-
ployed. Note that YR = E [X |Y, µˇ] depends on two parameters:
1) µˇ = µ + E and 2) Y = X + W ; thus, if we increase
the obfuscation noise by increasing σ2w , YR relies less on Y
and more on µˇ. Now in the extreme case, where σ2w goes
to infinity, the observed location (Y ) is useless and, as a
result, YR = E [X |Y, µˇ] = µ. Hence, remapping technique leaks
complete information about the statistical model (µ) as σ2w
goes to infinity.
V. RANDOMIZED REMAPPING AND NUMERICAL RESULTS
As derived in Section IV, the remapping technique can leak
information about the distribution of the true location (µ) if the
adversary does not have the perfect prior about the user. Here,
we introduce a new technique called randomized remapping to
improve privacy. This technique provides a trade-off between
the leakage of the distribution of the true location (µ) and the
leakage of the true location (X). In the randomized remapping,
we have an unfair coin where the probability of a head is equal
to pH . For each location, we toss the coin and if a head is
observed, the remapped location (YR) is released, and if a tail
is observed, the noisy version of location (Y ) is released. As
a result,
Z =
{
YR, with probability pH,
Y, with probability of 1 − pH,
The user’s friend observes Z; thus, the MSE of the application
is
U(I I I )
Rand
= E
[(Z − X)2] = pH σ2w
σ2w + σ
2
s
+ (1 − pH )σ2w . (10)
However, the adversary observes both Z and µˇ = µ + E to
estimate the true location (X) and distribution of the true
location (µ). We can calculate P`(I I I )
Rand
which indicates the MSE
of the adversary about the distribution of the true location (µ)
as:
P`(I I I )
Rand
= E
[
(µ˜Adv − µ)2
]
. (11)
Figure 3a shows the MSE of the adversary about the statistical
model (P`(I I I)
Rand
) versus the MSE of the intended applica-
tion/friend (U(I I I )
Rand
). We can also calculate P(I I I )
Rand
which
indicates the MSE of the adversary about the true location
(X) as:
P(I I I )
Rand
= E
[(
X˜Adv − X
)2]
. (12)
Figure 3b shows the MSE of the adversary about the true loca-
tion (P(I I I )
Rand
) versus the MSE of the intended application/friend
(U(I I I )
Rand
).
From Figures 3a and 3b, we can conclude that the standard
remapping leaks significant information about the statistical
model, while providing the best privacy level for the user’ true
location. Here, the randomized remapping provides a much
better trade-off compared to standard remapping. The value
of pH is a design parameter, so, based on the application
requirements and privacy requirements, the appropriate value
of pH should be chosen.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
The technique of “remapping” has been introduced in the
privacy literature to improve the utility of a naive intended
recipient while maintaining the same level of privacy against
a sophisticated adversary, in particular one with a prior distri-
bution of the user’s data.
We have provided an information-theoretic investigation of
this technique. We first formulated and analyzed remapping
under the standard assumption of an adversary with perfect
knowledge of the statistical model for the user location. Then,
we showed that if the adversary has imperfect knowledge of
the statistical model, the standard remapping technique leaks
privacy of both the released location data and the model.
Finally, we proposed a new method called randomized remap-
ping which makes it difficult for the adversary to improve
their prior knowledge at a given utility, thus providing a
better utility-privacy trade-off than the standard remapping.
Future research will consider an extension of the analysis and
countermeasures for generic classes of private datasets.
(a) The MSE of the adversary about the statistical model (µ) (b) The MSE of the adversary about the user’ true location (X)
Fig. 3: The MSE of the adversary versus the MSE of the application for three cases. Case 1: remapping technique is not
employed (pH = 0), Case 2: a randomized remapping technique is employed with pH = 0.2, 0.4, 0.6, and 0.8, and Case 3:
standard remapping [10] is employed (pH = 1). Here, we assume σ2µ = σ2e = σ2s = 1 and σ2w is swept from 0 to 1 with steps
of 0.1.
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